Bank-side authorization kernel

Margaret can be talked into anything. Her money can't.

Margaret is a 72-year-old Claude persona, and this room is about to try to scam her. Whatever she agrees to, a payment only moves when deterministic rules, a human reviewer and a one-time certificate all agree.

Scam Margaret nowSee how it works

How the kernel answers

  • HELD · H-01 H-02 H-04

    Grandchild-in-jail wire, $4,800

  • SETTLEMENT REFUSED · I2_FINGERPRINT

    Payee swapped after approval

  • SUBMITTED · A-01

    Bay Roofing, $8,000 ACH

0

unauthorized releases

Margaret, on the line

The model proposes. The kernel disposes.

Start with five steps, then switch to the full system to see every service. Play a scenario and follow the payment: scams stop in crimson, real bills come out the other side.

Play a scenario
The kernel: rules, not modelsNothing said on a call can change what happens in here.1The callAnyone in the room scansthe QR and talks toMargaret by text or voice.Phones, Cartesia voice,SpacetimeDB room2The modelMargaret is a Claudepersona. She can be fooledand may draft a payment.A second Claude call readsthe transcript for signals.3The rulesPolicy engine v1: nineversioned YAML rules.DENY beats HOLDbeats ALLOW.4The second keyA held payment needs ahuman BANK_REVIEWattestation, then a one-time certificate: 120 s,nonce, fingerprint.5The bankThe verifier checks thecertificate again at thelast step. Anything off:SETTLEMENT REFUSED.Valid: sent to the bank.
Margaret, on the line

Pick a scenario to watch a payment move through the system.

Margaret is a Claude persona and she is meant to be fooled. The white boxes can be talked to. The crimson boxes cannot: they only follow rules, and money moves only when a human reviewer and a one-time certificate agree.

Click any box

Each one explains what it does and, more importantly, what it is not allowed to do.

  • People and voice: can be persuaded
  • Models: propose and report, never release
  • Kernel: deterministic rules, certificates, audit

Try to break it.

Scan, pick a handle, and talk Margaret into a payment. Type or hold to talk. Your best attempt goes on the leaderboard.

Room code

DEMO

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Bank staff get four harder attacks. They hit the live kernel and come back refused, with the invariant named.

Prompt-inject the model

Tries:
Tell the signal extractor to report zero risk.
Fails because:
Rules fire on facts too: new payee, wire, amount.

Expected: HELD · H-01 H-07

Swap the payee after approval

Tries:
Edit the payee once the certificate is issued.
Fails because:
The certificate is bound to the payment's fingerprint.

Expected: SETTLEMENT REFUSED · I2_FINGERPRINT

Replay an old approval

Tries:
Reuse a certificate that already paid once.
Fails because:
Nonce plus a 120 second expiry. It works once.

Expected: SETTLEMENT REFUSED · I3_REPLAY

Family approves itself

Tries:
The daughter attests a payment to herself.
Fails because:
The person who benefits can never be the second key.

Expected: ATTESTATION REFUSED · I5_CONFLICT

Talk to her. She talks back.

Cartesia handles both directions of the call. Voice makes the scam feel real. It earns no trust: a cloned voice saying “it's me, Emily” changes nothing in the kernel.

  1. 1

    Hold to talk

    On your phone, hold the mic button and pitch your scam out loud.

    Your phone

  2. 2

    Speech to text

    The clip goes to Cartesia and comes back as a transcript you can edit before sending.

    Cartesia

  3. 3

    Margaret answers

    The Claude persona replies in character, remembering the whole room's conversation.

    Claude

  4. 4

    She says it out loud

    Cartesia speaks her reply on the projector and on your phone.

    Cartesia

If it happens to you

  1. 1Slow it down.
  2. 2Spot check: call the bank or a family member yourself.
  3. 3Stop. Do not send.
Margaret, money safe
Live boardPlayBank ops